ABSTRACT As a promising future Internet architecture, named data networking (NDN) supports namebased routing and caching for content retrieval throughout the network, which enables fast, reliable, and, more importantly, energy-efficient content dissemination in smart cities. However, NDN's vulnerability against the content poisoning attack is considered to decelerate the process of applying NDN to energy management in smart cities. The content poisoning isolates valid content from the network by injecting a poisoned content with a legitimate name into in-network caches. The caching, delivery, and signature verification of poisoned content diminish the advantage of NDN in energy efficiency when it disseminates content in smart cities. This paper focuses on content poisoning mitigation for energy management in smart cities and first analyzes the state of the art and the challenges of content poisoning mitigation. We then propose a light-weight mitigation mechanism by enhancing NDN with a name-key-based forwarding and multipath forwarding-based inband probe. Name-key-based forwarding forwards interests toward content sources trusted by consumers to reduce the injection of poisoned content. If there is still on-path content poisoning, the multipath forwarding of a reissued interest that excludes poisoned content acts as inband probes and invokes on-demand signature verifications at intermediate routers. This purges poisoned content from caches as soon as possible, delivers legitimate content to the present consumer, and restores legitimate content retrieval for future Interests without requiring any out-of-band communications. Our experimental results demonstrate that our proposed content poisoning mitigation mechanism restores legitimate content retrieval pretty soon with relatively small verification overhead at intermediate routers and is well adapted to diverse network settings, which would accelerate the deployment of NDN in smart cities to disseminate content in an energy-efficient way.
I. INTRODUCTION
Content distribution accounts for a significant portion of today's internet usage, including the traffic usage in smart cities, as a result of the increasing popularity of sharing user generated data (e.g., YouTube) and delivering multimedia content (e.g., Netflix) [1] - [3] . That said, most of the traffic in smart cities would be generated by content retrieval applications. To meet the growing demand of content delivery in a fundamental way, a promising future information-centric network, Named Data Networking (NDN) [4] , focusing on named data rather than named host, is proposed. Two prominent features of this novel networking paradigm are its in-network caching capability and the receiver-driven content retrieval paradigm. NDN addresses and routes every packet by name. Its communication is driven by a receiver 1 issuing an Interest packet which specifies the name of the desired content. NDN nodes 2 forward the Interest towards the potential source(s) of its matching Data packet according to its name. Each NDN content router has caching capability, a data structure referred to as the content store (CS) and can cache Data packets that pass by. Any node that has the matching Data packet could reply the Interest. And thus the Interest may be satisfied without resorting to the original remote content provider(s). Such in-network caching capability enables fast, reliable, and, more importantly, energy-efficient content dissemination in smart cities [5] , [6] . The energy efficiency of NDN is validated by simulations [1] , [7] - [9] and energyefficient in-network caching schemes are extensively investigated by the research community [10] , [11] .
However, there is a significant attack in NDN, content poisoning, that decelerates the process of applying NDN to energy management in smart cities. NDN offers contentbased security by content producers signing each Data packet and intermediate routers verifying the signature. Consumers must, and routers can, verify the signature to ensure they receive the correct content. However, the signature verification burdens routers with multiple verifications per Data and, perhaps more importantly, having to understand application specific trust semantics and key revocations. And thus on the fly signature verification is not mandatory at intermediate routers. The impracticality of routers verifying all signatures on forwarded or cached Data packets opens the door for content poisoning attack [12] . A Data packet is corrupted if its signature is invalid, or fake if it has a valid signature, however, generated by a wrong (private) key. We refer to the corrupted and fake Data packets as poisoned content. The content poisoning attack injects poisoned content and isolates valid content from the network. This type of attack is launched by satisfying an Interest with a poisoned Data packet whose name matches with the name specified in the Interest. The poisoned content contaminates caches of intermediate routers while being forwarded back to the consumer and may be further utilized to serve future Interests. What is worse, though the receiver can reissue an Interest that excludes the poisoned content after verifying its signature, the reissued Interest may not move forward to the legitimate content source(s) and may be satisfied with extra poisoned content. The caching, delivery and signature verification of such poisoned content diminish the advantage of NDN in energy efficiency when it disseminates content in smart cities [13] .
To recover from content poisoning attack, the network must remove poisoned content from caches and forward Interests towards a different content source. Existing content poisoning mitigation solutions focus on preventing 1 Receiver, consumer and user are interchangeably used in the rest of the paper. 2 NDN node and router are interchangeably used in the rest of the paper.
consumers from unknowingly retrieving poisoned content or removing poisoned content from caches or exploring alternative forwarding options to restore legitimate content retrieval. None of them make efforts to reduce the chance of poisoned content entering the network, remove existing poisoned content and explore alternative forwarding options together, and some of them are costly in the mitigation. This work proposes a light-weight content poisoning mitigation mechanism by considering these factors together to facilitate NDN's energy management in smart cities. Our proposed mitigation mechanism enhances NDN with name-key based forwarding and multipath forwarding based inband probe. Name-key based forwarding forwards Interests towards content sources trusted by consumers, which reduces the chance of poisoned content entering the network. If poisoned content is still injected before an Interest reaches its legitimate content source, the Interest issuer that receives the poisoned content would reissue the Interest which excludes the poisoned content after its verification work. The immediately reissued Interest invokes multipath forwarding and ondemand signature verifications at intermediate routers. Such multipath forwarding acts as inband probes to purge cached poisoned content and explore alternative forwarding options to restore legitimate content retrieval without requiring any out-of-band communications. During the multipath forwarding based inband probe, signature verification is invoked at intermediate routers for cached content excluded by matching Interest(s) or a returned Data packet arrival from a face that has recently brought back poisoned content and serving an Interest that excludes poisoned content. Such on-demand signature verification balances the requirement of on the fly verification for content poisoning mitigation and the verification burdens on routers. To the best of our knowledge, the proposed mitigation mechanism is a practical solution for content poisoning attack due to its simplicity and no requirement for coordination between routers. The contributions of our work can be summarized as follows:
• We undertake an in-depth analysis of the existing work of content poisoning mitigation and identify the challenges we still need to address while designing a mitigation mechanism.
• We propose to mitigate content poisoning by enhancing NDN with name-key based forwarding and multipath forwarding based inband probe. We articulate the design details and theoretically analyze the overhead.
• We conduct an experimental study to investigate the performance of our proposed content poisoning mitigation mechanism. The experimental results demonstrate that our proposed content poisoning mitigation mechanism restores legitimate content retrieval pretty soon with relatively small verification overhead at intermediate routers and is well adapted to diverse network settings, which would accelerate the deployment of NDN in smart cities to disseminate content in an energy-efficient way. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The state of the art and the challenges in content poisoning mitigation are analyzed in Section II. Section III elaborates the design details of our mitigation mechanism and theoretically analyzes its overhead followed by the experimental study of the proposed mitigation mechanism in Section IV. Finally, we conclude the paper and give insights for future work in Section V.
II. THE STATE OF THE ART AND CHALLENGES IN CONTENT POISONING MITIGATION A. THE STATE OF THE ART
Content poisoning mitigation has recently attracted much attention from the research community [12] , [14] . This attack resembles other DDoS attacks in the smart grid [15] . It isolates valid content from legitimate consumers and forces routers in smart cities to cache and deliver poisoned content. Nguyen et al. [16] gained a comprehensive understanding of the attack's feasibility and impact in a real network and demonstrated through an experimental measurement campaign that content poisoning can easily and widely affect NDN. One way to mitigate content poisoning is by enforcing the use of self-certifying content names whose last component is the hash value of the content [12] , [17] , [18] . In terms of the hash value embedded in an Interest, the validity of a Data packet can be checked without performing signature verification. However, the hash value of dynamically-generated content cannot be created and informed a priori and thus this approach can only be applied to static content.
Prefix hijacking [12] is an important reason that the content poisoning attack occurs. Without any form of trusted authentication and authorization, anyone is free to advertise content under any prefix, which facilitates the launch of content poisoning. Mosko et al. [19] presented a preliminary design and a complete end-to-end workflow that enables data producers to begin serving content under a namespace they are authorized to use. We borrow this secure name configuration and prefix registration in our mitigation design.
Ghali et al. [20] , [21] proposed Interest key binding (IKB) to prevent consumers from unknowingly retrieving poisoned content. IKB enforces each consumer to specify publisher public key digest (PPKD) while issuing an Interest and each content producer to include its public key in the KeyLocator field of its Data packets. Though each router does not need to perform fetching, storing or parsing of public key certificates, as well as revocation or expiration checking, they still have to verify each Data packet that passes by, which is still a heavy burden on NDN routers. So we introduce our ondemand signature verification to balance the requirement of on the fly verification for content poisoning mitigation and the verification burdens on routers. Besides, though IKB can prevent consumers from unknowingly retrieving poisoned content, it cannot guarantee the reachability of legitimate content. This is because NDN forwarding (that is, FIB entry and next hop selection) exclusively uses names. Selectors, such as the KeyLocator, are only considered during the Interest-Data matching process, not forwarding. Therefore, we introduce name-key based forwarding to forward Interests towards users' specifying data sources.
Ghali et al. [22] also presented a mitigation mechanism based on a ranking algorithm for cached content. Its objective is to probabilistically distinguish between valid and poisoned content based on observed consumer behavior, and prioritize valid over poisoned content in response to consumers' Interests. A lower rank is assigned to content with many recent exclusions, over fewer or old ones. The present semantic of excluding content is not unique in NDN. Besides excluding poisoned content, consumers may exclude content from an undesired content publisher or of an undesired version. Therefore, it may be difficult for the object ranking calculated based on the recent exclusion history to exactly depict content poisoning.
Kim et al. [23] proposed that a router accepts to cache all the Data it forwards, but only verifies them when there is a cache-hit. Successfully verified Data packets are forwarded without further verification and favored in the CS. Although this indeed reduces the routers' load, they still maintain verification for popular content, which should not be a small burden on the routers. Whereas our on-demand signature verification would further alleviate the verification burden on NDN routers. In addition, bad clients can still reissue bad Data to insert them in a cache, or increase the load on the router by sending Interests to create cache-hit for unpopular content, which is referred to as a verification attack. Kim et al. [24] further carefully looked at the possible concerns of their work, especially the verification attack mentioned above, and presented to exploit the relationship between the amount of serving content and the number of cache-hit events to defense against the verification attack.
Ribeiro et al. [25] , [26] proposed CCNCheck, a mechanism that makes all routers in the network to check the signature of contents according to certain probabilities. In [27] and [28] , the authors presented a similar strategy called 'Lossy Caching'. In Lossy Caching, content is verified and cached with a certain probability. Routers minimize verification overhead by lowering the probability. However, the probability also affects the hit ratio as well as the recency of network caches. As the probability becomes lower, verification and caching are limited to more popular content, but caches are more likely to be filled with outdated content. Hence, it is challenging to find the optimal probability value. In addition, Lossy Caching is strongly coupled with probabilistic caching, and it is difficult to apply this scheme to different types of cache replacement policies.
DiBenedetto and Papadopoulos [29] addressed on-path content poisoning. They presented a novel system for detecting, reporting and avoiding poisoned content that leverages the verification work that consumers must do anyway and the adaptive and stateful forwarding plane of NDN [30] . Alternative forwarding options are explored to restore legitimate content retrieval based on consumers' reports of poisoned content. In the proposed system, consumers are asked to send extra reports to routers and routers have to maintain the name list of arrival Data packets as well as their arrival faces and aggressively send traffic to explore alternative legitimate paths. We argue that this places extra burden on both consumers and routers.
Wu et al. [31] proposed a similar approach as that in [29] called router-oriented mitigation (ROM) of content poisoning. ROM defends against content poisoning by temporarily excluding the malicious routers from transmission path and eliminating (or significantly reducing) the probability that the content will be poisoned during transmission. Reputation for each router is introduced and a router with a better reputation is more likely to be included in the transmission path. The goal is to eliminate, or at least bypass, on-path attackers in the network. The calculation of the reputation is based on the assumptions that Interests are all multipath forwarded and consumers are trusted and will not send back misleading verification results, which may not be the practical situation.
In [32] and [33] , security enforcement architectures based on capabilities were developed to enforce different security policies by embedding capabilities in NDN packets. They achieve lightweight capability generation and verification, inspired by the one-time signature algorithm based on the Merkle Hash Tree [34] , [35] . Each Data packet piggybacks a capability such that each NDN node can verify the Data by verifying its capability. Any fake or malicious data packets cannot be verified and will be dropped. From the perspective of loads on routers, such capability-based security enforcement architectures do not free routers from verifying each Data packet that passes by (even if the verification overhead is relatively smaller as compared to NDN), but place extra burdens of maintaining capability information on routers.
B. CHALLENGES
Based on the above analysis of the existing work, we still need to address three challenges while designing a content poisoning mitigation mechanism.
• How can we forward an Interest towards userspecified legitimate content source(s)? If Interests are forwarded towards user-specified legitimate content sources, the chance of returning undesired content and attackers poisoning content can be reduced. In IKB, though a consumer specifies the PPKD in an Interest, the Interest may not be forwarded towards the specified publisher. The reasons for that may be the following two. First, without any form of trusted authentication and authorization, anyone is free to advertise content under any prefix and routers are not sure if they forward Interests towards legitimate content sources. Second, each FIB entry at NDN routers records only a naming prefix and next hop(s) to forward Interests with names under that prefix and routers forward Interests exclusively based on names. Routers are not sure about if the next hop to which they forward an Interest is to the userspecified producer.
• How can we restore legitimate content retrieval from on-path content poisoning? Even if forwarding Interests towards user-specified legitimate content sources can reduce the chance of attackers poisoning content, it cannot eliminate on-path content poisoning. When onpath content poisoning occurs, network elements must be able to explore alternative forwarding options to restore legitimate content retrieval. Otherwise, Interests will continue to be forwarded towards and satisfied by malicious Data packets so long as the network prefers a path to a bad content source.
• How can we keep content poisoning mitigation as a light-weight process? It is already a challenge for routers to forward and cache packets at line-speed. And thus content poisoning mitigation should not place a significant burden on them. Even though IKB relieves routers from multiple verifications per Data, perhaps, more importantly, from understanding application specific trust semantics, key revocations and multiple key retrievals per Data, it still places a significant burden on the routers to verify each received Data packet on the fly. These costs become less justifiable if content poisoning turns out to be a rare event.
III. SYSTEM DESIGN
Energy router system plays an important role in the energy management in smart cities [36] , whereas the caching and delivery of poisoned content waste energy and reduce the system stability [37] . This section proposes a light-weight content poisoning mitigation mechanism to forward Interests towards user-specified legitimate content sources and explore alternative forwarding options to restore legitimate content retrieval if there is still on-path content poisoning. Fig. 1 illustrates the overview of our proposed content poisoning mitigation mechanism. To forward Interests towards userspecified legitimate content sources, we propose to authenticate the authorization of each route advertisement in the route building phase and enable name-key based forwarding at NDN routers. If on-path content poisoning still occurs, NDN routers perform multipath forwarding based inband probe, i.e., forwarding the reissued Interest that excludes the poisoned content via multiple paths, and invoke on-demand signature verifications for the cached content excluded by the reissued Interest or the returned Data packet that matches the reissued Interest and arrival from a face that has recently brought back the poisoned content. On the one hand, such multipath forwarding increases the chance of bringing back the desired content to the present consumer. On the other hand, alternative forwarding options are explored to restore legitimate content retrieval for future requests. Moreover, the poisoned content is immediately purged from in-network caches. 
A. AUTHENTICATING THE AUTHORIZATION OF ROUTE ADVERTISEMENT
It is an effective way to reduce the injection of poisoned content by authenticating the authorization of route advertisement. Each content prefix announcer, i.e., content provider, is enforced to claim the PPKD of the content it provides and present the certificate of being authorized to provide content under the prefix when announcing its content prefix.
We assume there will be some form of coordinated namespace assignment responsible for managing namespaces. Assignment authority signing keys would therefore be well known and pre-installed on every NDN node. Systems like NDNS [38] assign prefixes to authorized content providers and provide the necessary lookup mechanism for determining ownership. Any node can leverage such a directory to determine the authorized key(s) for a given namespace [19] , [29] . The access router of the routing announcer is responsible for checking if the announcer is authorized to provide content under the announced prefix. Fig. 2 shows the basics of the authorization check and the related detail is out of the scope of this paper. If the announcer passes the check, its access router records both the announced prefix and the corresponding PPKD to generate a FIB entry and further forwards the announcement to other routers in the routing system. Otherwise, the announcement is discarded. Since routers in the system have established mutual trust via NDN's built-in security, in this fashion, prefix hijacking should be eliminated. This attempts to prevent content poisoning from the root so that consumers distributed in smart buildings or vehicles will not waste energy verifying signatures of poisoned content [39] .
B. NAME-KEY BASED FORWARDING
While issuing an Interest, a consumer in smart cities specifies its desired publisher in the Interest [21] . That said, the consumer needs to obtain and validate the producer's public key before issuing an interest for any content originated by that producer. This can be achieved by the following two alternatives:
• The assignment authority mentioned above may be leveraged to response to consumer-issued Interests referencing public key names and/or name prefixes and reply with signed content containing one or more public key certificates corresponding to requested names.
• A similar approach is a global search-based service, i.e., something resembling today's Google. A consumer would issue a search query (via an Interest) to the search engine which would reply with signed content representing a set (e.g., one page at a time) of query results. One or more of those results would point to content corresponding to the public key certificate of interest to the consumer. Note that the consumer needs to somehow securely obtain the root public keys for the search engine at first. Upon the arrival of an Interest, intermediate routers in smart cities perform name-key based Interest forwarding. That is, they forward the Interest by matching both the content name and the PPKD of the Interest with that of FIB entries. To perform name-key based forwarding, besides name (prefix), each CS, FIB and PIT entry should also record the PPKD that signs the content under the name (prefix). Fig. 3 illustrates the customized forwarding state at an NDN router and Algorithm 1 shows the name-key based Interest forwarding. By this means, the Interest is forwarded towards the content provider specified and trusted by the consumer. The content provider is enforced to include its publisher key in the KeyLocator field of the responsive Data packet. To avoid excessive signature verification overhead, intermediate routers in smart cities do not verify the signature of each passing-by Data packet and only check if the hash digest of the publisher key included in the Data packet is equivalent to the PPKD specified in the matching Interest(s).
C. MULTIPATH FORWARDING BASED INBAND PROBE AND ON-DEMAND SIGNATURE VERIFICATION
However, name-key based forwarding cannot eliminate on-path content poisoning. More particular, in smart cities, although Interests are forwarded towards publishers specified by consumers, on-path routers may be manipulated by attackers and reply the Interests with poisoned content. Note that as intermediate routers would check if the PPKD of a Data packet matches that specified by the Interest issuer, during an on-path content poisoning attack, only corrupted rather than fake Data packets may return to consumers. To mitigate on-path content poisoning, we further propose Return the cached copy to consumer(s) 4: else 5: PitEntry ← PIT .find(cname, PPKD) 6: if PitEntry = ∅ and the nonce is not seen before then 7: Add iface to the incoming faces of PitEntry 8:
FibEntry ← FIB.find(cname, PPKD) 10: if FibEntry = ∅ then 11: Choose the best next hop to forward the INT Notify the FIB entry that brings back the cached copy of the verification result 8: if Verified to be poisoned then 9: Purge the cached copy from the CS 10: Demote and flag the next hop in the FIB entry that brought back the poisoned Data as a poisoning face if necessary 11: end if 12: end if 13: else 14: PitEntry ← PIT .find(cname, PPKD, excluded) 15: if PitEntry = ∅ and the nonce is not seen before then 16: Add iface to the incoming faces of PitEntry 17: else 18: FibEntry ← FIB.find(cname, PPKD) 19: if FibEntry = ∅ then 20: if only one next hop h in FibEntry then 21: forward INT via h 22: else 23: for all next hop h in FibEntry and not flagged as a poisoning face do 24: forward INT via h 25: end for 26: end if 27: end if 28: end if 29 PitEntry ← PIT .find(cname, PPKD, excluded) 6: if PitEntry ≡ ∅ then 7: Discard the unsolicited DATA 8:
if The Interest recorded by PitEntry excludes a Data packet and iface has recently brought back poisoned content and DATA is verified to be poisoned then 10: Drop the poisoned DATA 11: Notify the FIB entry that brings back DATA of the verification result 12: Demote and flag the next hop in the FIB entry that brought back the poisoned Data as a poisoning face if necessary 13: else 14: Forward DATA towards downtream 15: Cache DATA according to local cache policy 16: end if 17: end if 18: end if Besides, the multipath forwarding of the reissued Interest acts as inband probes to restore legitimate content retrieval for future Interests. And the stateful forwarding plane 3 [30] plays an important role in this recovery phase. As demonstrated in Fig. 3 , it additionally records the on-demand signature verification result history in a sliding time window for each next hop of each FIB entry. Note that for a cached Data packet, the next hop bringing it back is recorded in the CS as well so that its on-demand signature verification result can be reflected in the signature verification history of the next hop. If the number of recently returned poisoned Data packets in a time window exceeds a configured threshold, such next hop is demoted to the least preferred for its FIB entry and flagged as a poisoning face. A poisoning face would not be utilized for Interest forwarding, not even the multipath forwarding of reissued Interests. As presented in [30] , the stateful forwarding plane periodically probes the next hops of each FIB entry. For a poisoning face, the Data returned from it in the probes would be verified. It would be kept as the least preferred until it brings back authentic Data packets. And thus once the poisoning next hop starts to be normal again, it can re-enlist as soon as it is probed.
Note that our multipath forwarding based inband probe restores legitimate content retrieval only if there is another path between the consumer and any legitimate content source except the poisoned path. For a router that has only one next hop for the content retrieval, it has no choice but to continue forwarding Interests to the poisoning face if it still wants to deliver Data to consumers in the hope that its upstream routers would switch to other forwarding options. We reduce the ondemand signature verification overhead with the following designs. First, the on-demand signature verification process is not invoked until the cache hit of an excluded poisoned Data packet. This avoids the unnecessary verification overhead if malicious consumers deliberately flood the network with Interests that exclude nonexistent content. Second, for a poisoning face, the future Data packets it brings back for reissued Interests and those it brought back, cached in the CS and excluded by an Interest would be dropped without signature verifications. Third, for the router that has only one next hop for the content retrieval, once the next hop starts to bring back legitimate Data, its on-demand signature verification process ends. Such on-demand signature verification enables NDN routers in smart cities to discover content poisoning as well as manage local energy usages in signature verifications.
D. OVERHEAD ANALYSIS
The main overhead of our content poisoning mitigation mechanism results from the following aspects:
• Recording the PPKDs per name prefix • Recording the incoming faces of cached Data packets • Recording the on-demand signature verification history per prefix per hop if there is content poisoning
• On-demand signature verifications • Multipath forwarding of reissued Interests The space of recording the PPKDs per name prefix is proportional to the number of the PPKDs of name prefixes. The space of recording the incoming faces of cached Data packets is proportional to the cache sizes at routers. The above space overhead exists anyway, whereas the following overhead exists only if content poisoning occurs in the network. The space of recording the on-demand signature verification history is proportional to the number of on-path routers from consumers to the content poisoning attacker. The upper limit of the number of on-demand signature verifications in an involved router is the configured threshold judging a poisoning face. And the upper limit of the number of the multipath forwarding of reissued Interests at a router is the product of the number of received such reissued Interests and that of the available next hops for the matching FIB entry. In brief, on the one hand, when there is no content poisoning in the network, the overhead of information maintenance is negligible; on the other hand, while content poisoning occurs in the network, the overhead of on-demand signature verification and multipath forwarding of reissued Interests is controllable and relatively small. Therefore, as compared to the existing mitigation mechanisms, our proposed mitigation is a desired light-weight one.
IV. EVALUATION
This section presents an experimental study to quantify the effectiveness of our proposed content poisoning mitigation mechanism and also studies the factors that impact its performance. As it is obvious to understand that name-key based forwarding mitigates content poisoning, this section focuses on investigating the effectiveness of multipath forwarding based inband probe and on-demand signature verification in content poisoning mitigation.
A. APPLICATION SCENARIOS
We use the open-source ndnSIM [40] package which implements the NDN protocol stack for the NS-3 network simulator (http://www.nsnam.org/) to run simulations for a variety of scenarios on a 2.70GHz CPU with RAM 4.0GB. We extend ndnSIM by adding on-demand signature verification in content store and forwarding strategy as well as multipath forwarding based inband probe in forwarding strategy.
1) NETWORK TOPOLOGY
We run our simulations on a topology as illustrated in Fig. 4 . The content server is attached to router 0. There are two paths between the content server and each consumer. For example, there are two paths, routers 0−1−2−4−6−7−8 (7 hops), and routers 0−1−3−5−7−8 (6 hops), between the content server and consumer 0. A shorter path is preferred over a longer one. Note that although the topology is simple and there may not be a smaller smart city, it is enough to simulate the multipath forwarding scenario and provide a basic understanding of the proposed mitigation mechanism.
2) METHODOLOGY
As the on-demand signature verification at a router is not invoked until a reissued Interest that excludes poisoned content gets cache hit, we study how cache replacement policy, the probability that routers cache a Data packet and cache capacity at a router impact the effectiveness of multipath forwarding based inband probe. Besides, the impact of the number of consumers is examined as well. For each test round, we assume consumers express Interests as a Poison process at an average speed of 10 Interests/s. The number of distinct content units of the same size in the network is 1×10 3 and consumers' access to these items follows the Zipf distribution with shape parameter 0.7. We set homogeneous cache sizes at all routers as Rossi and Rossini [41] suggested in terms of the number of content units and each router caches passing-by content units with a configured probability. Each link in the topology is assigned a bandwidth of 1Gbps greater than the traffic demand and a propagation delay of 1ms. When the system reaches a steady state, a content poisoning attacker compromises router 5 and generates poisoned Data packets on the shorter path from the content server to the consumers, which simulates an on-path content poisoning attack. If a next hop gets caught bringing back more than 3 poisoned Data packets, it is judged as a poisoning face. Note that we merely take the value 3 as an example of the threshold judging poisoning to understand our design. The actual threshold judging poisoning should be configured based on the experience of local operator or dynamically adapt to the traffic load. Table 1 shows the setting of primary parameters in our simulations. Each simulation is repeated 10 runs to get its average results, and each run is set with different NS-3 ''RngRun'' arguments as seeds to randomize the request traffic and probabilistic caching. 
3) PERFORMANCE METRICS
We quantify the performance of our content poisoning mitigation mechanism from the following two aspects:
• the number of Interests excluding poisoned content and reissued by consumers in total before legitimate content retrieval restoration
• the number of on-demand signature verifications in total for restoring legitimate content retrieval They respectively reflect how fast the network restores legitimate content retrieval and the overhead of intermediate routers in restoring legitimate content retrieval from content poisoning.
B. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

1) THE IMPACT OF CACHE REPLACEMENT POLICY
As shown in Fig. 5 , the average number of reissued Interests that exclude poisoned content and the average number of on-demand signature verifications for restoring legitimate content retrieval are all 5 and 10 respectively with cache replacement policies least recently used (LRU), least frequently used (LFU) and first in first out (FIFO), whereas 45 and 20 respectively with RANDOM. It is because that our on-demand signature verification process is not invoked until the cache hit of an excluded poisoned Data packet. With the cache replacement policy LRU, LFU or FIFO, when the attacker launches content poisoning, the first 5 reissued Interests excluding poisoned content get cache hits of the excluded poisoned Data at router 7 and invoke the on-demand signature verification process. And router 7 judges its next hop, router 5, as a poisoning face pretty soon and restores the legitimate content retrieval by switching to another next hop router 6. Whereas with the cache replacement policy RANDOM, the first 5 Interests that exclude poisoned content get cache hits at routers with much smaller probability. Then extra poisoned Data packets are delivered to the consumers, and more Interests that exclude poisoned content are further issued. And as there is less cache space competition at the access routers of the consumers as compared to that at router 7, the on-demand signature verification processes at these access routers start earlier than that at router 7. Before the on-demand signature verification process at router 7 starts, the Data packets forwarded towards the consumers are poisoned and verified at these access routers where the signature verifications start. These verifications are extra as compared to those with LRU, LFU or FIFO. As there is no difference in our considered two metrics with LRU, LFU and FIFO, the cache replacement policy is set to LRU in our other simulations.
2) THE IMPACT OF CACHING PROBABILITY
As illustrated in Fig. 6 , as the caching probability increases from 0.1 to 1.0, the number of reissued Interests that exclude poisoned content decreases at first and starts to reach the minimum, 5, that is, each consumer reissues one Interest for restoring legitimate content retrieval, when the caching probability increases to 0.4; and the number of on-demand signature verifications increases as the caching probability does. It is because the probability that poisoned data packets store in content stores increases and the on-demand signature verification processes are invoked earlier at these routers. Then router 7 can judge the next hop, router 5, as a poisoning face earlier. That said, the number of Interests that exclude poisoned content would be less, but no less than that each consumer reissues one Interest. During the recovery phase, router 7 is involved in the signature verification anyway and contributes to 4 verifications. But the number of access routers involved in the signature verifications mainly grows with the caching probability, which leads to more verifications. When the caching probability increases to 1.0, FIGURE 6. Simulation results for evaluating how the caching probability impacts the effectiveness of our proposed content poisoning mitigation mechanism.
the 5 access routers are all involved in the verifications and each contributes to 2 verifications. As we demonstrate neither the best nor the worst performance of our proposed mitigation mechanism, the caching probability is set to 0.7 in other simulations.
3) THE IMPACT OF CACHE SIZE
As displayed in Fig. 7 , as the cache size increases, the number of Interests that exclude poisoned content remains as 5 and the number of on-demand signature verifications decreases a little bit. It is because that with caching probability 0.7, no matter how large the cache size is within the range of 5 to 45 content units, the first 5 Interests that exclude poisoned content are enough for router 7 to judge the next hop, router 5, as a poisoning face. While with larger cache size, router 7 invokes on-demand signature verification process and gives its judgment a little earlier. And thus the access routers are less involved in the on-demand signature verifications, which contributes to the decrease of the number of on-demand signature verifications. 
4) THE IMPACT OF THE NUMBER OF CONSUMERS
As illustrated in Fig. 8 , as the number of consumers increases, both the number of Interests that exclude poisoned content and the number of on-demand signature verifications almost linearly increase. It is because that after the content poisoning occurs, each consumer issues an Interest that excludes poisoned content and each access router may be involved in the on-demand signature verification process. And thus the two measured numbers linearly increase as the number of consumers does. Whereas we find that as the number of consumers increases, the number of signature verifications at router 7 does not change and remains as 4 since router 7 ends its on-demand signature verification process as soon as it gives its judgment. 
V. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
This work proposes to mitigate content poisoning by enhancing NDN with name-key based forwarding and multipath forwarding based inband probe for energy management in smart cities. Based on the analyses of the results in our experimental study, on the one hand, our content poisoning mitigation mechanism restores legitimate content retrieval pretty soon; on the other hand, the verification overhead at the core routers is relatively small and stable under different cache replacement policies, cache space competitions and request traffic loads. It is demonstrated that our proposed content poisoning mitigation mechanism is well adapted to diverse network settings, which would accelerate the deployment of NDN in smart cities to disseminate content in an energyefficient way.
This paper examines the effectiveness of our mitigation mechanism under the scenarios with probabilistic caching on a small-scale topology. We would extend our evaluations to more realistic network scenarios under other caching policies [42] - [45] with Rocketfuel topologies [46] and real-world traffic traces in smart cities.
Both consumers and routers in smart cities may be manipulated by attackers to misbehave. That is, a manipulated consumer may issue fake Interests that exclude nonexistent or unpoisoned content or a manipulated router may intermittently reply Interests with poisoned content. Therefore, we identify several directions for our future work:
• We would refine the mitigation mechanism to defend against the attack scenario in which attackers in smart cities intermittently return legitimate and poisoned content. The configured threshold judging a poisoning face or the sliding time window may be dynamically adjusted based on the attackers' behavior.
• We further consider to defend against the attack launched by malicious consumers flooding the network in smart cities with Interests that exclude nonexistent or unpoisoned content. 4 
